Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Although an increasing number of states has explicitly acknowledged the plea of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness to be applicable in situations of cyber emergencies, important doctrinal questions remain underexposed in both official expressions of opinio juris and in the literature. The article closes this gap by giving an account of three of the most salient issues in the context of the necessity defence: the "only way" requirement, the condition of non-contribution, and assistance by unaffected states to defensive measures taken in emergencies. It concludes that while recently growing academic criticism of the prevailing strict understanding of the "only way" criterion might be less relevant in the cyber context, states should consider more explicitly how emerging norms obliging states to observe a certain standard of cyber hygiene in regard to domestic cyber infrastructures could influence legal assessments as to a possible contribution to a situation of cyber emergency, potentially precluding the necessity defence. Finally, long-running doctrinal debates surrounding the exact legal nature of the defence within the larger context of the customary rules on state responsibility are revisited to examine whether third states could be permitted to come to the help of imperilled states even if the defence does not apply to them individually.

AbstractThe increasing use of digital technologies in cyberspace in the context of international conflicts has put pressure on the existing legal framework of international law. After progress in terms of norm development and clarification could be achieved through multilateral processes at the United Nations, Russia's invasion of Ukraine cast doubt on the possibility of further breakthroughs. In light of this development, unilateral declarations of legal positions by states will gain further relevance.

AbstractRussia's aggression against Ukraine has brought into focus the growing significance of open-source information for international legal processes. Enabled by novel digital technologies, civil society actors have seized the opportunity provided by the vast amount of publicly available evidence to counter-narrate Russia's pretexts to justify its invasion within the deliberative bodies of the United Nations. This Essay explains the potential of this emerging practice to influence international legal discourse by increasing the costs for actors who base their conduct on false factual claims.

Abstract
This article examines the legal issues concerning the establishment of responsibility for an internationally wrongful act in the context of transboundary disinformation. In light of the unprecedented surge of potentially dangerous health disinformation throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, there is growing consensus among academics and states that influence campaigns that utilize false or misleading information may qualify as a violation of international law, amounting to a prohibited coercive intervention, a breach of the target state's territorial inviolability or independence of state powers or, in extreme cases, even a use of force. However, the aspects of attributing the dissemination of disinformation to a state and of demonstrating a causal nexus between disinformation and effect that are necessary for international responsibility to arise have not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. This article analyses the challenges that contemporary forms of digital disinformation create for proving attribution pursuant to the customary rules of state responsibility as well as the issue of causation. In doing so, it investigates the content of the primary rules for clues pertaining to the necessary causal nexus and assesses different standards of causation employed in international and domestic law.

Ever since the revelations about concerted disinformation campaigns ahead of and surrounding the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential election, but also in the context of troubling developments in the global information space since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue has become a hot topic in international legal scholarship. However, after a few years of debate, there remain some fundamental concerns with how state-led influence operations are addressed, both in academia and among state actors. With that in mind, the following brief remarks seek to make five claims that may challenge and clarify some of the key features of current legal discourse.

AbstractThe legal implications of information activities in the context of armed conflict against the background of the digital transformation have so far received only scarce attention. This article aims to fill this gap by exposing some of the legal issues arising in relation to mis- and disinformation tactics during armed conflict in order to provide a starting point for further debate in this respect. Specifically, it explores the existence and content of existing limits imposed by international humanitarian law on (digital) information operations and inquires whether the current framework adequately captures the humanitarian protection needs that arise from such conduct.

Addressing both scholars of international law and political science as well as decision makers involved in cybersecurity policy, the book tackles the most important and intricate legal issues that a state faces when considering a reaction to a malicious cyber operation conducted by an adversarial state. While often invoked in political debates and widely analysed in international legal scholarship, self-defence and countermeasures will often remain unavailable to states in situations of cyber emergency due to the pervasive problem of reliable and timely attribution of cyber operations to state actors. Analysing the legal questions surrounding attribution in detail, the book presents the necessity defence as an evidently available alternative. However, the shortcomings of the doctrine as based in customary international law that render it problematic as a remedy for states are examined in-depth. In light of this, the book concludes by outlining a special emergency regime for cyberspace

Addressing both scholars of international law and political science as well as decision makers involved in cybersecurity policy, the book tackles the most important and intricate legal issues that a state faces when considering a reaction to a malicious cyber operation conducted by an adversarial state. While often invoked in political debates and widely analysed in international legal scholarship, self-defence and countermeasures will often remain unavailable to states in situations of cyber emergency due to the pervasive problem of reliable and timely attribution of cyber operations to state actors. Analysing the legal questions surrounding attribution in detail, the book presents the necessity defence as an evidently available alternative. However, the shortcomings of the doctrine as based in customary international law that render it problematic as a remedy for states are examined in-depth. In light of this, the book concludes by outlining a special emergency regime for cyberspace.